Divine Universal Causality and the Particular Problem of Hell: A Quiescence Solution by Wood, A. (Adam)
181 9(2 ) /2021 , 181–199
 9(2)/2021  ISSN 2300-7648 (print) / ISSN 2353-5636 (online)
Received: January 18, 2021. Accepted: May 5, 2021 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2021.024
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Abstract. I call the Particular Problem of Hell (PPH) the problem of explaining why 
God allows a certain set of created persons to populate hell, as opposed to allowing 
some other set of created persons to do so. This paper proposes a solution to PPH on 
behalf of proponents of Divine Universal Causality (DUC) – the view, roughly, that 
God causes everything distinct from himself to exist at any time it exists. Despite 
initial appearances, I argue, proponents of DUC can adopt a version of the popular 
approach to the Problem of Hell sometimes called the Choice Model. My proposal is 
based upon Eleonore Stump’s Thomistically-inspired notion that our wills can enter 
a state of “quiescence” with respect to a given option. While proponents of DUC will, 
I argue, most likely find Stump’s own quiescence-based solution to PPH unaccepta-
ble, there is a way of modifying her approach that renders it compatible with God’s 
causing everything distinct from himself, including the free choices of his creatures. 
Keywords: Theodicy; Predestination; Reprobation.
Suppose you think that some but not all persons will forever occupy hell, 
at least in part because of certain sinful choices they have freely made. 
Suppose, furthermore, that you believe in Divine Universal Causality 
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(DUC), the view that, as W. Matthews Grant has recently put it, “Neces-
sarily, for any entity distinct from God, God directly causes that entity to 
exist at any time it exists” (Grant 2019, 4). In that case, it might appear 
that the most popular contemporary approach to the Problem of Hell, 
what Jonathan Kvanvig calls “the Choice Model” (Kvanvig 2011, chaps. 
1–3), is unavailable to you. According to Kvanvig’s version of the Choice 
Model and most others, persons occupy hell in part because of sinful 
choices they’ve freely made, and God could not have prevented these 
choices without impinging the creatures’ freedom. Yet if DUC is true, 
then whatever free choices we make are, themselves, caused by God, in-
cluding sinful ones. It might seem, then, that by refraining from causing 
some or all sinful choices, God could have avoided any persons occupy-
ing hell. Explaining why he didn’t do so in general is a thorny problem, 
to be sure. But in addition to this “General Problem of Hell” (GPH), as 
I will call it, there is also a different, narrower problem, namely explain-
ing why one particular set of persons ends up occupying hell as opposed 
to some other set. I call this latter issue the “Particular Problem of Hell” 
(PPH). The focus of this paper is examining how proponents of DUC 
might address it. 
The Choice Model dispatches both GPH and PPH easily in one fell 
swoop. God allows hell in general because he wanted some of his crea-
tures to be free, and couldn’t prevent some free creatures from choosing 
to be forever separated from him, which is part of what it means to oc-
cupy hell. Only those persons occupy hell, furthermore, whom God could 
not prevent from making the sinful choices that are at least partially re-
sponsible for their damnation. On DUC, however, God causes any choices 
we make, including any sinful choices. So we might wonder why he caus-
es one particular set of persons to make sinful choices that result in their 
occupying hell, as opposed to causing some other set of persons to do so. 
If his decision to cause sinful choices in some particular set of persons is 
arbitrary, this might well appear unfair and hence unjust on his part. 
In this paper I suggest a way that proponents of DUC might avoid charg-
es of arbitrariness, unfairness or injustice in responding to PPH by draw-
ing upon Eleonore Stump’s Thomistically-inspired suggestion that in ad-
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dition to willing for or against a given option, the will may also “turn itself 
off,” entering a state of “quiescence” with respect to that option (Stump 
2001, 139–41 and 2003, chap. 13). In this paper’s first section, I explain 
further the contours of PPH, especially as it presents itself to proponents 
of DUC. In the second section I explain how Stump’s appeal to the notion 
of quiescence might appear to provide a response to PPH, and why this 
sort of response is unavailable to proponents of DUC. In the last section 
I develop a modified version of Stump’s quiescence-based Choice Model 
that proponents of DUC might accept, and defend it against a series of ob-
jections.
1. Divine Universal Causality and the Particular Problem of Hell
To explain PPH further, especially as it presents itself to proponents of 
DUC, it will be helpful to rely on a few traditional theological terms: pre-
destination, reprobation, and merits. No doubt there are diverse opin-
ions in the theological tradition about how best to understand these 
terms, but I will use them as follows. By the first, I mean God’s providen-
tial guidance of the lives and decisions of certain created persons such 
that they ultimately achieve everlasting happiness. If God refrains from 
guiding certain created persons in this way, such they ultimately fail to 
achieve everlasting happiness, this I will call reprobation. Finally, mer-
its are simply morally valuable features of created persons on the basis of 
which they might be said to deserve everlasting happiness. 
With this terminology in place, we can understand PPH as a matter of 
navigating an apparently inconsistent set of four propositions:
 (1) Predestination and reprobation cannot be based upon foreknown 
merits.
 (2) If predestination and reprobation aren’t based upon foreknown 
merits, then they’re arbitrary.
 (3) If predestination and reprobation are arbitrary, then they’re un-
just.
 (4) Predestination and reprobation aren’t unjust.
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The first proposition, put another way, claims that God’s reason for 
predestining those whom he predestines and reprobating others cannot 
be that he foreknows that certain persons will accrue certain merits while 
others won’t. I’ll explain shortly below why I think proponents of DUC 
are committed to this claim. For now, it will be helpful to note that in the 
Christian tradition even those who would reject DUC might nevertheless 
be committed to (1) so as to avoid the heresy of Pelagianism. To avoid Pe-
lagianism, it is often thought, any meritorious features of created persons 
must be the results of God’s grace. But if the presence or lack of merit de-
pends on whether or not God offers us grace, then seemingly whether God 
predestines or reprobates us cannot be based upon foreknowledge of mer-
its. The other three claims, by my lights, enjoy strong intuitive support. 
If God doesn’t base his decisions to predestine or reprobate on the pres-
ence of certain morally valuable features of created persons, then it’s hard 
to see what other relevant factors he might base these decisions on. And 
if his decisions aren’t based on anything relevant at all, then seemingly 
they’re arbitrary. Arbitrarily allotting everlasting happiness to some but 
not all, however, intuitively seems unfair, and hence unjust. But if God is 
necessarily morally perfect, as is usually supposed, then his decisions to 
predestine or reprobate cannot be unjust. Since claims (1)–(3) jointly im-
ply the denial of (4), propositions (1)–(4) taken as a whole are apparently 
an inconsistent set. Denying (4) seems like an option unavailable to the-
ists, who will wish to insist on God’s impeccability, include his perfect 
justice. So which of (1)–(3) can proponents of DUC reject?
Not (1), for reasons similar to the anti-Pelagian considerations I men-
tioned above. According to proponents of DUC, it is not just meritorious 
features of created persons that must depend on divine activity, but any-
thing created whatsoever. Again, DUC holds that for any entity distinct 
from God, God directly causes that entity to exist at any time it exists. 
That goes for any meritorious choices, acts or habits that we might come 
to possess. If God must cause these features of created persons in order for 
them to exist in the first place, then seemingly he cannot also base his de-
cisions to predestine or reprobate on his foreknowledge of their presence.
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Denying (3) is a possibility that some Christian theologians of the past 
have seemed willing to embrace. In Romans 9:20–23 Paul writes:
But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its 
molder, “Why have you made me like this?” Has the potter no right over the 
clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and anoth-
er for dishonorable use? What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make 
known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared 
for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of 
mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory.
One might interpret this passage as conceding that predestination and 
reprobation are arbitrary and unfair, but denying that they are unjust, 
for at least two reasons. First, just as the potter doesn’t owe any particu-
lar shape to his clay, neither does God owe everlasting happiness to an-
yone. Accordingly, it isn’t unjust if he doesn’t grant everlasting happi-
ness to some, even if he refrains from granting it for no particular reason. 
Second, if it is very good for God to predestine some and reprobate oth-
ers in general, and if there is no non-arbitrary way for him to accomplish 
this, then the goodness of predestining and reprobating in general might 
outweigh the badness of doing so arbitrarily and unfairly. So much so, 
perhaps, that his decision to arbitrarily select some but not all for ever-
lasting happiness cannot be considered unjust overall. But Paul’s words 
about “making known” God’s power and glory might appear to indicate 
one good reason he has for reprobating some: so that he can manifest his 
wrath at the sins due to which, at least in part, they end up in hell. Per-
haps this chance to make known his anger toward sin is such a great good 
that enacting it outweighs on the scales of justice the unfairness of arbi-
trarily selecting some for reprobation. Thomas Aquinas and Jonathan Ed-
wards, among others, seem to embrace reasoning like what I’ve just de-
scribed. Aquinas, for instance, compares God to a builder grasping some 
stones out of a pile for the top of a wall he is building and other stones 
for the bottom (Summa theologiae [ST] 1a.23.5 ad 3 and Epistolam Pauli 
ad Romanos lectura 9.4.788). Beyond the fact that the builder’s plan re-
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quires some stones at the top and some at the bottom, there is no reason 
why certain stones end up in one place and others elsewhere. Neverthe-
less, I consider the denial of (3) a sort of “bullet-biting response” to the 
PPH. If God had the option of predestining everyone, then it is difficult to 
see what good was achieved by making known his power, glory, anger at 
sin or whatever else through reprobation, as opposed to doing so by some 
other means, particularly if reprobating some required his acting arbi-
trarily and unfairly.
The solutions to PPH upon which I’ll focus in the remainder of this pa-
per are best seen as efforts to reject (2). In the following section I’ll dis-
cuss a proposal of Stump’s that might easily be adapted into a response 
to PPH, maintaining that while (1) is correct – predestination and repro-
bation cannot be based upon foreknown merits – nevertheless they can 
be based upon foreknown quiescence in the wills of sinners who cease ac-
tively resisting God’s grace. As I’ll explain, proponents of DUC will most 
likely find Stump’s version of this proposal unacceptable, since it assumes 
that God is unable to move a sinner’s will from a state of active resist-
ance to one of quiescence. Nevertheless, I’ll argue in the final section, 
a modified form of Stump’s proposal might indeed render it compatible 
with DUC and provide its proponents with a response to PPH that avoids 
claiming that God acts arbitrarily.
2. Stump’s Quiescence-Based Choice Model
Stump initially suggested the notion of quiescence as a possible solution to 
a problem she sees as confronting Augustine in his later work. As Stump 
notes, in Augustine’s relatively early De libero arbitrio 3.18–19 he seem-
ingly maintains that while human persons are incapable of morally up-
right first-order acts of will apart from God’s gracious assistance, God of-
fers grace to all and only those in whom is present a higher-order act of 
willing to receive it. Even in his later anti-Pelagian works Augustine ap-
pears to uphold this same basic stance – Stump 2001, 134 cites De natura 
et gratia 47.81 as an example. In his later works, however, Augustine makes 
abundantly clear that the higher-order act of willing to receive God’s grace 
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is itself also dependent on grace; God must cause it as well (see De correp-
tione et gratia 2.3 and De spiritu et littera 31.53–34.60, both of which Stump 
2001, 137 cites, along with De gratia et libero arbitrio [DGLA] 7.17 and 14.28 
and De praedestinatione sanctorum [DPS] 2.3). The question, then, as Au-
gustine saw, is why God causes in some a higher-order act of willing for 
God to reform their unruly desires, while causing no such higher-order 
act in others. As Stump reads him, Augustine ultimately concluded that 
he had no good answer. She quotes De dono perseverantiae 8.18, where Au-
gustine responds to the question why God punishes some and not others, 
despite knowing that his grace causes good choices or deeds in anyone, 
“I confess I can find no answer to make” (Augustine 1999, 201). Augus-
tine, in other words, sees no good answer to the question that PPH raises 
(see also DGLA 23.45 and DPS 8.14–15). But Stump reckons that there is, 
in fact, an answer available to Augustine even given his staunch anti-Pe-
lagianism, provided he is willing to accept that in addition to willing for or 
against a given option, the will may also simply turn itself off with respect 
to that option. Stump calls the will’s simply ceasing to act with respect to 
a given option “entering a state of quiescence,” and thinks she finds Aqui-
nas endorsing the idea at ST 1a2ae.9.1 and 10.2.
Whether she is correct on not in her interpretation of Thomas, here is 
how she thinks accepting the notion of quiescence in the will might pro-
vide Augustine a solution to PPH. I may will to receive grace from God, or 
I may will to reject it. I may also, however, simply cease willing one way 
or another when it comes to receiving grace. To cease willing in this latter 
way is to enter a state of quiescence with respect to the option in question 
(receiving grace). Now while a created person’s willing to receive grace is 
an act that is, itself, dependent on God’s grace as its cause, their entering 
a state of quiescence isn’t an act at all. Accordingly, even while maintain-
ing his anti-Pelagian insistence that the higher-order act of willing for 
God to reform our desires is itself caused by God, Augustine could main-
tain that it is within our power to cease rejecting God’s grace by entering 
a state of quiescence with respect to that option. As Stump puts it, “the 
will’s lapsing into quiescence is not itself another act of will, any more 
than ceasing to walk east is another act of walking. But since the laps-
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ing into quiescence is not an act of will at all, it can hardly be considered 
a good act. So ... Pelagianism is warded off” (Stump 2003, 402). If we enter 
a state of quiescence with respect to receiving God’s gracious assistance, 
Stump suggests, God will in fact provide the grace we need to request his 
aid in further reforming our moral character. If, however, we continue ob-
stinately willing to reject grace, God will not provide it. Now, while Stump 
never as far as I know applies the notion of quiescence directly to questions 
regarding predestination or reprobation, it is clear how her quiescence-
based proposal on Augustine’s behalf might be adapted as a solution to 
PPH. It is true, Stump might say, that predestination and reprobation can-
not be based upon foreknown merits, since any meritorious features of 
created persons are dependent on God’s grace as their cause. Neverthe-
less, she might say, God’s choices to predestine or reprobate needn’t be ar-
bitrary, but might be based rather on whether or not a creature persists in 
rejecting God’s grace. God predestines all and only those who do not pre-
vent him from doing so by persisting in a state of active resistance to his 
aid. Adapted this way, Stump’s proposal might be viewed as offering a sort 
of Choice Model in response to the Problem of Hell in general, and to PPH 
in particular. 
As attractive as Stump’s proposal might be, nevertheless, it seems un-
likely to me that proponents of DUC could accept it. That is because, on 
DUC, the choice on the part of unrepentant sinners to persist in reject-
ing God’s gracious assistance and predestination must itself be caused by 
God. Likewise, for sinners to cease resisting grace requires such that their 
wills enter a  state of quiescence requires that God cease causing their 
acts of resistance. If these matters are so, however, then the questions re-
emerge why God would cause any sinful choices to begin with, or cause 
certain sinners to persist in actively resisting grace, while ceasing to do 
so in the case of others whom, ultimately, he predestines.
As far as I can tell, Stump’s own answers to the questions would be 
that God cannot prevent sinners from making sinful choices, nor from 
persisting in resisting grace should they choose to do so. At several points 
she states baldly that in her estimation even an omnipotent entity like 
God cannot “make” a person freely will anything (see Stump 1985, 406; 
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1986, 194–95; 1988, 411–412). And in at least one passage she appears 
to suggest that God’s causing a created person’s will to occupy any giv-
en state would involve coercion incompatible with freedom (Stump 2003, 
506-7 n. 11). Nevertheless, Stump argues elsewhere that God can sanctify 
sinners by reforming their lower-order desires provided they already have 
a higher-order desire that he do so (Stump 1988). In fact, as her sugges-
tion on Augustine’s behalf makes clear, she thinks God can himself cause 
in created persons a higher-order desire for moral reformation provided 
that the creatures have ceased actively resisting his aiding them in this 
way. What Stump evidently believes God cannot do, however, is prevent 
created persons from sinning in the first place, or to bring it about that 
a sinner in a state of active resistance should repent. 
It is not altogether clear to me why Stump holds these views, but it 
does seem likely that proponents of DUC must reject them. According to 
DUC, again, God directly causes the existence of any entities distinct from 
himself at any time they exist. Assuming, then, that the sinful choices of 
created persons are entities distinct from God, he directly causes them 
as well. Hence, unless proponents of DUC want to maintain that God for 
some reason had to cause sinful choices, they must admit that he could re-
frain from doing so, and that if he so refrains then created persons will not 
sin. It was an option available to God, then, to bring about a world full of 
free creatures who never sin. Or, alternatively, it was an option available to 
bring about a world full of creatures who sin, yet repent before the end of 
their lives. Either way, it seems likely that proponents of DUC must accept, 
against what Stump supposes, that God could have predestined everyone, 
and didn’t have to reprobate anyone. If that is so, however, then for pro-
ponents of DUC Stump’s proposal as it stands can solve neither the gen-
eral problem of why God reprobates anyone at all, nor the Particular Prob-
lem of Hell: providing some rationale for God’s decisions to reprobate the 
particular creatures he does. In the following section, however, I’ll out-
line a modified quiescence-based Choice Model that I think proponents 
of DUC might indeed accept. If successful, this model would provide them 
a response to PPH, though not an answer to the question why God permits 
hell to be occupied in general.
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Before launching into it, however, let me pause briefly to consider 
whether proponents of DUC might maintain that God had to cause sinful 
choices after all. Molinists might conceivably claim that, given the coun-
terfactuals of creaturely freedom, God had to cause sinful choices if he 
wanted to make any free creatures at all. Perhaps given these counter-
factuals it wasn’t, in fact, open to God to bring about a world full of free 
creatures who never sin, or full of sinful creatures all of whom repent be-
fore the end of their lives. Molinists might then respond to GPH just as 
the Choice Model does; God allows hell because he couldn’t avoid it with-
out impinging creaturely freedom. As for PPH, Molinists might again rely 
on the counterfactuals of creaturely to engineer a different sort of re-
sponse than either Stump’s or the one I’ll propose in the remainder of 
this paper. For my part, I won’t pursue this possibility further here for 
two main reasons. First, I consider Molinism implausible. I find persua-
sive the criticisms voiced against it in Adams 1977; Rogers 2008, 148–152; 
Grant 2019, 126–28 and elsewhere. But Molinists respond to these and 
other objections in ingenious ways, and I certainly cannot prosecute an 
effective case against their view here. Second, however, it is unclear to 
me whether Molinists can subscribe to DUC, or whether they would wish 
to. Contemporary Molinists sometimes distinguish between “strong” and 
“weak” actualization and suggest that God only “causes” free choices or 
actions in the sense of weakly actualizing them (see Plantinga 1974, 173 
and Flint 1998, 111). Since “causation” is sometimes suggested as equiva-
lent to “strong actualization” it may be that these contemporary Molin-
ists would reject the notion that God causes creaturely choices or actions, 
and hence reject DUC. At any rate, readers can proceed with the knowl-
edge that I haven’t ruled out the possibility of Molinism providing propo-
nents of DUC with a different and superior response to PPH then what I’ll 
suggest in the following section. 
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3. A Quiescence-Based Choice Model for Proponents 
of Divine Universal Causality
My proposal hinges on the claim that even if God causes every act of eve-
ry created person, nevertheless the created persons can be praised or 
blamed for their actions. For example, if a created person decides to re-
bel against God, even if that person cannot do so without God’s concur-
ring causally with their decision, they may nevertheless be blamed for it. 
Suppose, then, that God brings all humans at some stage of their lives to 
a point where they aren’t actively rebelling against him. From this point 
of non-rebellion, suppose furthermore that some created persons turn 
to actively resisting God’s grace while others persist in non-rebellion. 
Because we are supposing that God has done just as much for the both 
groups – bringing both to a point where they are not actively resisting 
his grace – the fact that the former group turns (or returns) to rebellion 
while the latter does not might represent a reason for God to provide the 
latter further gracious assistance that he withholds from the former. This 
lack of assistance might explain why some humans persist in rebelling 
against grace until, ultimately, they end up in hell. Yet it needn’t repre-
sent an arbitrary decision on God’s part. Rather, it might be predicated 
upon certain humans’ decisions to return to active rebellion against him. 
This, then, might provide proponents of DUC with a way of solving PPH.
To illustrate how my proposal might work, consider first two angels at 
the very first moment of creation. On one widely-held medieval view, an-
gels were not granted beatitude straightaway after they were created in 
order that, having chosen to accept beatitude as a gracious gift from God, 
they might merit it – see Pini 2013 for discussion of this view in Anselm, 
Aquinas and Scotus. Instead of making this meritorious choice, however, 
some angels like Lucifer straightaway decided instead that they wanted 
beatitude to some extent or in some way unbefitting their natures. Grasp-
ing wrongly for beatitude, these angels rebelled against God, commit-
ting what is sometimes called the primal sin. Now proponents of DUC 
should acknowledge, I think, that God could have prevented this primal 
sin if he had wanted to. He might have done so, for instance, by granting 
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all angels beatitude at the very first moment they were created. Or if he 
wished to delay their beatitude, he could simply have caused every angel 
to make the meritorious choice to accept beatitude as a gracious gift in 
the way they were meant to. We might well wonder why God didn’t fore-
stall the primal sin in one of these ways. Setting that wonderment aside, 
however, it seems as though God did just as much for Gabriel at the mo-
ment of creation as he did for Lucifer. That is, he created both of them 
with abundant knowledge and with powers of intellect and will as yet un-
exercised. When Lucifer immediately thereafter decides to go after beati-
tude in some illicit way God concurs causally with his rebellious choice, 
just as he does with Gabriel’s acceptance of beatitude as a gracious gift. 
Again, God didn’t have to do so. But having done so and allowed Lucifer’s 
rebellion, it seems not unreasonable for him to punish Lucifer for having 
made the choice he did. It is true that Lucifer could not rebel unless God 
caused him to do so. But proponents of DUC who are compatibilists will 
claim that God’s determining a creature to act a certain way doesn’t re-
move the creature’s responsibility for their action, even if they could not 
have done otherwise. There are also libertarian proponents of DUC, who 
hold that God’s causing a creaturely action does not determine it, and in 
fact is compatible with the possibility of the creature’s having done oth-
erwise (see Grant 2019, chap. 4 along with Koons 2002 and McCann 1995). 
These will deny that God’s causing Lucifer’s act of rebellion in any way 
removed Lucifer’s power to choose beatitude as a gift of grace instead. Ei-
ther way, regardless of whether one prefers a libertarian or compatibilist 
version of DUC, one can maintain that Lucifer is responsible for his rebel-
lious choice, and that there exists a reason for God to treat him differently 
from non-rebellious angels like Gabriel.
Now humans are not angels, it’s true, but my proposal for solving PPH 
essentially involves God’s returning all humans to a  state importantly 
similar to Gabriel and Lucifer’s state at the at the first moment of crea-
tion in the story I just told. Many Christians take the doctrine of origi-
nal sin to imply that unlike angels at the very first moment of creation, 
all humans begin their lives in a state of active rebellion against God, or 
at least are born disposed to rebel more or less as soon as they will any-
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thing at all. But even if original sin ensures that all humans spend some 
period of their lives in active rebellion against God, it nevertheless seems 
possible to me that God might at some other point in their lives cause all 
humans to cease actively resisting his grace, whether by accepting it at 
least by entering a state of quiescence. If God does this at some point for 
all of us, then presumably for at least some amount of time afterwards it 
will remain an option available to us to lapse from our acceptance or qui-
escence to a state of active rebellion against God. If DUC is correct, then 
for this to happen, God would have to concur causally with our rebellious 
choices. Nevertheless, it seems to me, if for some pair of humans God has 
done an equal amount of causal work bringing them to a point where they 
are either accepting his gracious assistance, or at least quiescent and not 
actively resisting it, and one of these humans returns to rebellion while 
the other doesn’t, we might say the same as we did regarding Lucifer and 
Gabriel above. That is, we might judge that God has a good reason for fur-
ther assisting the one who persists in non-rebellion in ways he doesn’t 
assist the other.
Here is a further illustration of how this proposal might work, draw-
ing upon one that Stump employs. One way of interpreting the conver-
sion story Augustine narrates in Confessions book eight, Stump thinks, 
is as a story of Augustine’s entering a first a state of quiescence before 
ultimately being moved by God to accept his gracious assistance. Augus-
tine has listened to multiple narratives inclining him toward converting 
and accepting life of celibacy. Yet he is torn between this higher-order in-
clination and his lingering lower-order concupiscent desires. This is the 
state we find him in when he leaves Alypius to weep alone in the garden. 
As Stump puts it, “[t]he weeping seems to have been an expression of 
the conflict in his mind and of the accompanying stymied quiescence of 
the will, which was not able either to reject celibacy or to assent to it ei-
ther” (Stump 2003, 400–1). After this Augustine hears the child’s voice 
singing “take up and read!” which he takes as a command from God to 
open the scriptures. Upon reading the first verse he sees, he is finally 
able to assent to conversion and moral reformation. Suppose for the sake 
of argument that this interpretation of Augustine’s story is roughly cor-
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rect. And now imagine, furthermore, that Augustine has a twin brother 
whose life story has very closely paralleled Augustine’s own. Both have 
struggled throughout their lives with sexual addiction, but lately through 
the testimonies of their friends Ambrose, Simplicianus and others, both 
have found themselves drawn toward their mother’s Christian faith and 
a life of celibacy. Both find themselves deeply moved by Pontitianus’s ac-
count of Antony, and pray “grant me chastity and continence” (Confes-
sions 8.7.17 in Augustine 1991, 145). Yet they are torn, and add to their 
prayer, “but not yet.” Both rush from Alypius to weep alone in the garden, 
and find themselves in the state of “stymied quiescence of the will” that 
Stump describes. At this point, however, some time elapses. And Augus-
tine’s brother gets to thinking that he not only doesn’t want chastity just 
yet, but also doesn’t really want it at all. At some point before Augustine 
himself hears the child’s voice his brother gets up and tells Alypius he’s 
had enough of the country. He heads back to Milan and immediately vis-
its his favorite den of iniquity. In contrast, we already know what happens 
with Augustine himself. My claim is that if Augustine stays quiescent 
while his brother returns to active rebellion against God, that decision on 
his brother’s part would give God a reason for withholding further grace 
from the brother that he extends to Augustine himself, who hears the 
child’s voice, reads the scriptures, and has “a light of relief from all anxi-
ety flooded into [his] heart” (Confessions 8.12.19 in Augustine 1991, 153).
Now just in the case of Lucifer and Gabriel above, I think proponents 
of DUC should acknowledge that God could have caused both Augustine 
and his brother in this scenario to remain quiescent, and to accept the 
subsequent grace he extends. If Augustine’s brother ends up in hell, I do 
not intend for the story I’ve just told to provide us any explanation why he 
ends there as opposed to joining Augustine in heaven. It is not a solution 
to GPH. What the story does explain, I am proposing, is why Augustine’s 
brother might end up in hell as opposed to Augustine himself ending up 
there, hence providing a solution to PPH. Again, the reason is based upon 
their divergent responses to having been offered an equal measure of di-
vine assistance. I will now consider four objections that one might raise 
against this proposal. 
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First, one might argue that God couldn’t possibly bring all created per-
sons out of the original sin into which they’re born to a point of non-re-
bellion, as I have proposed he might do. One might point out, perhaps, 
that this would be impossible to do for humans who die as infants. I would 
reply to this by conceding that I don’t share Augustine’s certainty about 
the fates of those who die as infants. I’m not sure what will happen to 
them, and I’m happy to limit my proposal to humans without cognitive 
disabilities who live into adulthood. 
Second, one might argue that given the diversity of humankind, it is 
impossible for God to provide precisely the same measure of assistance to 
all humans. Because they come from such disparate starting points, God 
will have to assist some more than others to reach a point of non-rebel-
lion, and hence arbitrariness is inevitable. Perhaps it is true that to bring 
humans from the sinful origins they begin with to a point where they ac-
cept (or at least don’t resist) his grace he will have to assist them in differ-
ent and unequal ways. I don’t think this matters, however, as regards the 
success or failure of my solution to PPH. My proposal simply requires that 
God provide an equal measure of assistance to each human in the sense 
that he brings each of us at least once in our lives from the original sin 
into which we’re born to a point of non-resistance to his grace. It doesn’t 
matter especially what measures he takes to accomplish this, or how of-
ten he does so. It may be indeed that God renders greater assistance to 
some who ultimately choose to reject him. He might, for instance, bring 
them from active rebellion to acceptance or quiescence multiple times 
throughout their lives, only to have them relapse repeatedly. All my pro-
posal requires, I think, is that God provides at least as much assistance to 
those who ultimately end up choosing rebellion and hell as to those who 
ultimately end up accepting grace and glory.
A third objection might note that it certainly doesn’t seem as though 
all persons cease rebelling at some point in their lives. It is true, I would 
acknowledge, that some appear to resist God all throughout their lives. 
But appearances can deceive, and only God knows the hearts of men. 
Even hardened sinners might soften momentarily in private, reaching 
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a point of non-resistance toward God’s aid, even if they aren’t yet accept-
ing it. That is all my proposal requires.
The reason I  think Stump’s Thomistically-inspired notion of quies-
cence in the will is useful for my purposes here is largely in order to ward 
off a fourth objection someone might raise, alleging that God does not in 
fact provide the same measure of assistance to Lucifer and Gabriel or Au-
gustine and his brother in the stories I told above. In fact, someone might 
say, God provides additional aid to Gabriel and to Augustine in their re-
spective scenarios insofar as he causally upholds them in their state of 
non-rebellion during the same moment at which he ceases doing so for 
Lucifer and Augustine’s brother. This might, I think, be a legitimate wor-
ry about my proposal if indeed I were to suggest that God brings all hu-
mans, for instance, from an initial state of rebellion to one of accepting 
his grace, but then upholds only some in this state of positively willing 
to accept grace while ceasing to cause it others, and causing instead a re-
turn to rebellion. If, however, God brings us all to just to a point of quies-
cence, then perhaps the worry can be assuaged. As I understand Stump’s 
notion of quiescence, someone in this state retains their power of will, 
yet the power is inactive with respect to some given option – willing nei-
ther for nor against it. Returning to the case of Augustine and his twin 
with this in mind, it seems to me that at the moment the brother returns 
to active rebellion God is still causally upholding both in the exact same 
way insofar as he is sustaining in both their power of will. It is true that 
at that moment God is also causing in Augustine’s brother a positive act 
of choosing to return to rebellion, whereas he isn’t causing such a choice 
in Augustine himself. But since God is merely concurring causally with 
the brother’s own decision, it isn’t as though he causes the return to re-
bellion arbitrarily. Nor is God providing anything additional to Augustine 
that he is withholding from the twin. Again, he is causally upholding the 
power of willing in both. The following chart illustrates what I take to be 
the divine and human causal contributions in the scenario I’ve been dis-
cussing:
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In this chart time T1 is some earlier point in the lives of Augustine and his 
brother when both are still resisting conversion. Time T2 represents the 
point at which God moves both to cease rejecting grace, though not yet to 
accept it either – both are in a state of quiescence. At T3 the twin, but not 
Augustine, has returned to rebellion, and is once again rejecting grace. 
He is still doing so at T4, whereas by this point God has moved Augustine 
himself to accept his assistance in the process of moral reformation. My 
claim is that while it is true that God causes something different in the 
twin than he does in Augustine at points T3 and T4, there is a reason for 
this, namely the twin’s choice and the corresponding absence of choice 
on Augustine’s part at T3. If this is correct, then Stump’s notion of quies-
cence in the will can indeed help explain how God might non-arbitrarily 
decide between those to whom he’ll grant further grace and those from 
whom he’ll withhold it.
The solution to PPH that I have argued for in this section might be 
viewed as a kind of Choice Model, in that it bases God’s decision to allow 
the particular set of created persons to occupy hell that he does on choic-
es made by these persons. Specifically, he bases his decision on these per-
sons’ choice to return to active rebellion against him after having been 
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brought by him to a point of non-rebellion. By my lights a Choice Model 
is preferable to “biting the bullet” like Aquinas does, and conceding that 
God’s decision whom to predestine and whom to reprobate is ultimately 
arbitrary. I hope to have shown that a kind of Choice Model is available to 
proponents of DUC, at least far as PPH is concerned. Since, however, my 
proposal does not purport to provide any solution to GPH, more work re-
mains to be done for proponents of DUC interested in formulating a com-
prehensive response to the Problem of Hell.1 
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